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With the normalization of relations with the United States and other
countries, Cuba is ushering in a new era with unprecedented opportunities
in a globalized world. Participating in the world economy, however, is a
risky proposition. It requires policymakers to carefully weigh the pros
and cons of each development path and choose the one that best suits
Cuba. It also requires policymakers to be prepared for the perils, both
economic and legal, that may arise from Cuba’s participation in the world
economy.
This Article explores Cuba’s new role in the world economy and the
perils that accompany this new role. The article examines three
development models that have been utilized by other developing
countries: import substitution, export-oriented growth, and domestic
market-oriented growth. It argues that Cuba’s best development path is
likely a combination of the three, with different focuses in different stages
of development. The article then analyzes the perils of Cuba’s greater role
in the world economy. It focuses on three such perils: challenges posed
by Cuba’s protection of foreign investment through investor-state dispute
settlements, World Trade Organization (WTO) rules’ constraints on
Cuba’s use of domestic support measures, and foreign trade barriers that
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may be erected against Cuban exports by its trading partners. Cuba will
be better off if policymakers could anticipate such perils and devise
policy responses accordingly.
I. CUBA’S CURRENT ROLE IN THE WORLD ECONOMY
Unlike other former socialist countries that were isolated from the rest
of the international community before their transition to market
economies, Cuba has maintained an extensive network of international
commercial relationships through today. Cuba was a founding member
of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) and is a member
of the GATT’s successor organization, the WTO. Since 1975, Cuba has
been a member of the World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO),
a specialized agency of the United Nations created in 1967 to promote
intellectual property protection throughout the world. In 2000, Cuba
joined the African, Caribbean, and Pacific Group of States (ACP), an
organization aimed at facilitating trade and cooperation between its
member countries and the European Union. Cuba is also a member of the
Latin American Integration Association (ALADI) and the Bolivian
Alliance for the Peoples of Our America (ALBA), both of which promote
the economic integration of Latin America through trade and investment.
Finally, Cuba is a party to sixty bilateral investment treaties (BITs) with
a wide array of countries, including Western countries such as the United
Kingdom, Spain, and Italy.1
Although Cuba has maintained extensive international commercial
ties, it has not fully taken advantage of the commercial opportunities
afforded by those ties. As indicated in Figure 1, prior to the late 1980s,
Cuba’s foreign trade as a percentage of GDP hovered around 76%, in
large part due to its trade with the Soviet bloc of countries. In the wake
of the collapse of the Soviet Union, Cuba’s trade-to-GDP ratio
plummeted to about 30% in the early 1990s and recovered gradually to
about 45% in recent years.2 Although Cuba’s current trade-to-GDP ratio
is not particularly low in comparison with other countries in the region
(e.g., Brazil and Argentina), this apparently stable number masks the lack
of diversity in Cuba’s foreign trade sectors. Cuba’s exports, for example,
are primarily exports of agricultural products and natural resources or

1. International Investment Agreements Navigator, IIAs by Economy, Bilateral
Investment Treaties, U.N. CONFERENCE ON TRADE & DEV., http://investmentpolicyhub.unctad.
org/IIA/CountryBits/52 [https://perma.cc/GD9F-67GM].
2. Data for these statistics and for Figure 1 are from WORLD BANK, World Development
Indicators, http://data.worldbank.org/data-catalog/world-development-indicators [https://perma.
cc/YX4C-96Z7].
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services such as tourism and medical services.3 Cuba also relies heavily
on imports of essential goods such as oil, foods, machinery and
equipment, and chemicals.4 Cuba’s “[m]erchandise exports, reported at
$4.6 billion in 2010, were less than 10% of national output, reflecting the
low international competitiveness of much of Cuba’s industry and
agriculture.”5

Figure 1. Trade as Percentage of GDP
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Cuba’s lack of participation in the world economy can also be seen in
the small number of WTO dispute settlement proceedings in which Cuba
took part. Despite being a founding member of both the GATT and the
WTO, as of July 2017, Cuba has been a complainant in only one WTO
dispute settlement proceeding and has never been a respondent in a WTO
3. GARY CLYDE HUFBAUER & BARBARA KOTSCHWAR, ECONOMIC NORMALIZATION WITH
CUBA: A ROADMAP FOR U.S. POLICYMAKERS Table 1.1 (2014).
4. Id.
5. RICHARD E. FEINBERG, THE NEW CUBAN ECONOMY: WHAT ROLES FOR FOREIGN
INVESTMENT? 8 (2012), https://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2016/06/cuba-economyfeinberg-9.pdf [https://perma.cc/HFX7-NA5V].

Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 2017

3

Florida Journal of International Law, Vol. 29, Iss. 1 [2017], Art. 13

266

FLORIDA JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW

[Vol. 29

dispute settlement proceedings.6 This contrasts with the experience of
other major developing countries, which, as shown in Figure 2 below,
have played an active role in litigating trade disputes before the WTO. In
particular, China, which did not become a WTO member until 2001, has
already initiated seventeen WTO dispute settlement proceedings and has
been targeted in thirty-nine proceedings.7

Figure 2. Number of Distinctive WTO Dispute
Settlement Proceedings (as of July 2017)
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II. EXPLORING CUBA’S NEW ROLE IN THE WORLD ECONOMY
Since the collapse of the Soviet Union, the Cuban government
explored new ways to participate in the world economy. Cuba’s first step
was to attract foreign direct investment (FDI). In 1992, Cuba amended its
constitution to allow private property ownership and the transfer of stateowned property to joint ventures with foreign investors.8 In 1995, Cuba
enacted the Foreign Investment Act, which, among other things, allowed
foreign investment in all economic sectors except defense, health care,
and education, gave foreign investors the ability to own businesses in
Cuba, and guaranteed transfer of capital and compensation for

6. WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION, DISPUTES BY MEMBER, https://www.wto.org/english/
tratop_e/dispu_e/dispu_by_country_e.htm [https://perma.cc/PAG7-RZFT] [hereinafter DISPUTES
BY MEMBER].
7. Id.
8. HUFBAUER & KOTSCHWAR, supra note 3, at 86.
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expropriations.9 In 2014, Cuba renewed its efforts to attract FDI by
passing a new foreign investment law that provided tax incentives to
foreign investors investing in joint ventures in Cuba.10
Cuba’s current FDI plan, however, is far from being an integral part
of a comprehensive roadmap for reinvigorating its economy. Instead, the
plan heavily focuses on addressing the short-term needs of the Cuban
economy. The Portfolio of Opportunities for Foreign Investment, which
the Cuban government publishes every year to indicate the number and
types of business projects in Cuba open to foreign investment, clearly
demonstrates this limited focus. In the 2015 Portfolio, for example, the
Cuban government listed the number of foreign investment projects
available in each of the major economic sectors as follows:
Table 1. Business Opportunities by Sector
(Cuba Portfolio of Opportunities for Foreign Investment 2015)11
Sector
Mining
Agro-food
Tourism
Renewable Energy
Oil
Industrial
Transportation
Biotechnology and Medicine
Health
Construction
Business
Audiovisual
Total

# of Projects
15
40
94
22
86
21
15
9
3
14
4
3
326

While the above list covers a diverse set of sectors, it demonstrates
that the government’s priorities lay in tourism (94 projects, representing
approximately 29% of the total projects), oil (86 projects, 26%), and agrofood (40 projects, 12%). The government’s reasons for these priorities
9. Mireya Navarro, Cuba Passes Law to Attract Greater Foreign Investment, N.Y. TIMES,
Sept. 7, 1995, http://www.nytimes.com/1995/09/07/world/cuba-passes-law-to-attract-greaterforeign-investment.html [https://perma.cc/SVM3-SS8Z].
10. Daniel Trotta, Cuba Approves Law Aimed at Attracting Foreign Investment, REUTERS
(Mar. 29, 2014, 12:08 PM), http://www.reuters.com/article/us-cuba-investment-idUSBREA2S
0EJ20140329 [https://perma.cc/QUT9-UUZJ].
11. MINISTRY OF INDUS., INV. & COOPERATION DIRECTION, Cuba Portfolio of Opportunities
for Foreign Investment 2015, at 18–19, http://havana.be.mfa.gov.tr/images/localCache/12/
56712fb7-7b3c-4f0e-b597-e9f48e51d64c.pdf [https://perma.cc/2TZL-4RNM].
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are obvious: given Cuba’s traditional strength in tourism, that sector
offers an immediate source of hard-currency earnings. And investments
in the oil and agro-food sectors will reduce Cuba’s dependence on
imports of those essential products.
Beyond these priority sectors, however, Cuban policymakers do not
appear to have reached a consensus on the country’s development path.
As an example, look at Cuba’s industrial sector, specifically within
Cuba’s Special Economic Development Zone of Mariel. As shown in
Table 2 below, of the nine projects specifically identified for Mariel, five
are being developed solely to replace imports, three will serve both the
domestic and export markets, and only one covers just the domestic
market. This fairly balanced list gives no hints as to the focus of Cuba’s
economic development strategy, if there is any.
Table 2. FDI Projects in ZED Mariel
(Cuba Portfolio of Opportunities for Foreign Investment 2015)12
Manufacturing Project
Radial tires

Amount
$223 million

Aluminum cans
$40 million
Air conditioning equip- $15 million
ment
Light automobiles
To be negotiated
Valves for pressurized To be negotibodies
ated
Glass bottles for bever- $70 million
ages
Various
lines
of $10 million
glassware
Engineering and techno- To be negotilogical products enter- ated
prise
Expendable materials for $5 million
medical use

Purpose
Domestic market
export
Replace imports
Replace imports
Domestic market
export
Replace imports

and

and

Replace imports
Replace imports
Domestic
export

market

and

Domestic market

The lack of a clear development strategy at the outset of major
economic changes is understandable. But as Cuba’s economic reforms
deepen, Cuban policymakers must have a clear vision of the country’s
role in the world economy and channel the country’s collective efforts
accordingly. Toward that end, Cuba should consult the development
12. Id. at 24–28.
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models adopted by other major developing countries. Below, this article
briefly discusses three development models that have been utilized by
developing countries in Latin America and Asia: import substitution,
export-oriented growth, and domestic market-oriented growth.
A. Import Substitution
Import substitution is a development model closely associated with
Latin America. Also known as “Latin American structuralism,” this
development model advocates replacing foreign imports with domestic
production.13 Most countries in Latin America adopted it from the 1930s
to the late 1980s, with some initial successes.14 Between 1950 and 1980,
Latin America’s industrial output increased six-fold, well ahead of the
continent’s population growth.15 Mexico and Brazil were particularly
successful with this development model. By the early 1960s, domestic
production supplied 95% of Mexico’s and 98% of Brazil’s consumer
goods.16 Between 1960 and 1979, Mexico and Brazil collectively
increased their share of Latin America’s industrial output from 50% to
over 60% and attracted over 70% of the continent’s FDI over the same
period.17 By 1981, Brazil produced a third of Latin America’s GDP and
became the seventh-largest industrial producer in the world.18
The import substitution model, however, is not without problems.
First, although import substitution could successfully reduce or end
imports of certain goods, it merely replaces dependence on those goods
with dependence on imported capital goods, such as the heavy machinery
used to manufacture the import-substituting goods. To keep the prices of
imported capital goods low, the currency of the country that implements
the import substitution strategy often will be artificially overvalued,
which leads to slumping exports and ballooning trade deficits.
Second, although industrialization induced by import substitution
requires substantial capital, it cannot generate the number of new jobs
needed to absorb unemployed workers. This results in a two-tiered labor
force, where one tier is employed in the new, modern industrial sector
and the other tier is either unemployed or underemployed elsewhere.
Income inequality often occurs as a side effect of this two-tier labor force,
ultimately resulting in insufficient demand for the products of the new
13. See generally Kenneth P. Jameson, Latin American Structuralism: A Methodological
Perspective (Helen Kellogg Inst. for Int’l Stud., Working Paper No. 43, 1985), https://kellogg.nd.
edu/publications/workingpapers/WPS/043.pdf [https://perma.cc/LWN9-4RKY].
14. Id. at 5.
15. DUNCAN GREEN, SILENT REVOLUTION: THE RISE AND CRISIS OF MARKET ECONOMICS IN
LATIN AMERICA 15 (2003).
16. Id.
17. Id.
18. Id.

Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 2017

7

Florida Journal of International Law, Vol. 29, Iss. 1 [2017], Art. 13

270

FLORIDA JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW

[Vol. 29

industries.
Finally, import substitution shields domestic firms from foreign
competition and results in inefficient, oligopolistic industrial structures.
As a result, the domestic industry tends to become dominated by a few
privileged companies with close nexus to the state, and consumers
become saddled with expensive, low-quality products supplied by those
privileged, domestic companies.
The import substitution problems outlined above eventually led to
economic stagnation, inflation, and currency devaluations in Latin
America. In 1982, Latin America’s love affair with import substitution
came to an abrupt end when Mexico’s debt crisis erupted, causing Mexico
to default on its debt payments to international investors.
B. Export-Oriented Growth
Unlike Latin America, developing countries in East Asia moved away
from import substitution in the 1950s and turned to export-oriented
growth. The so-called “Asian Tigers” of Taiwan, Korea, Singapore, and
Hong Kong spearheaded this development model, which was then
adopted by Thailand, Malaysia, and more recently, China and Indonesia.
In essence, this development model manufactures and exports laborintensive goods by combining low-cost labor from the rural sector with
imported intermediate inputs and capital goods. Some Latin American
countries, after the failures of the import substitution model, also turned
to export-oriented growth. Mexico serves as a notable example, when, in
the early 1990s, it undertook a series of economic liberalization reforms
and pushed to become a member of the North American Free Trade
Agreement (NAFTA).
Export-oriented growth played an important role in the economic
successes of East Asian economies, particularly China. But its drawbacks
are obvious, too. First and foremost, export-oriented growth leads to
undue dependence on external markets. Such dependence is not a major
problem when external demand is steady, but may hurt the export
industries when external markets go into a long-term decline, as was the
case in the wake of the 2008–2009 global financial crisis.
Second, export-oriented growth, without more, does not create
conditions conducive to the upgrading of industries. When the surplus
labor supply that sustains the export sector dries up, labor costs will
inevitably rise, eliminating the main advantage of the export-oriented
industries.
Third, when coupled with aggressive liberalization of the financial
sector, export-oriented growth could create fertile conditions for financial
crises. When used in pursuit of profits, foreign capital is highly
susceptible to changes in costs of labor and capital. Such changes often
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spawn large-scale capital flows across national borders, which result in
financial instability. Indeed, the 1997 Asian Financial Crisis may have
been a direct outcome of this export-oriented growth model.
C. Domestic Market-Oriented Growth
A third development model used by developing countries is that of
India. Unlike the import substitution model or the export-oriented growth
model, both of which rely heavily on the foreign market, the India model
utilizes “a combination of growing domestic market demand and
investment in knowledge-intensive industry and services.”19 The India
model also relies heavily on domestic capital and homegrown
entrepreneurs.20 These internal mechanisms, therefore, better insulate
India’s economy from tumults in global markets. As a result, India’s
economy is arguably more stable than other export-focused economies,
with domestic consumption accounting for over 60% of India’s GDP, a
level approaching that of a fully developed economy.21
D. Cuba’s Best Development Path
Given Cuba’s economic conditions, Cuba’s best development path is
likely a combination of the three development models discussed above,
with different focuses in different stages of development. At the outset of
economic reforms, a dose of import substitution may be necessary to
alleviate shortage in industrial supplies. This is essentially what Cuba is
partly doing in its current efforts to attract FDI to its industrial sectors.
Cuban policymakers should be aware, however, that import substitution
does not provide a long-term solution to the economic problems facing
the country. Cuba’s small domestic market makes it unlikely that the
import-substituting firms would operate on an economic scale that would
justify the large capital investment in those firms, and the limited number
of such import substituting firms will almost inevitably lead to low
productive efficiency. Cuban policymakers should also keep a watchful
eye on worsening income inequality during the implementation of the
import substitution strategy.
At a certain point, Cuba’s economic policy should transition from
import substitution to export-oriented growth. Cuba’s current economic
plan already focuses on export in certain sectors, notably tourism, natural
resources, and agriculture. With the exception of tourism, however, such
exports are concentrated in primary commodities and will not be
19. See Daniel Park, The Growth Debate: India & China, https://www.b2binternational.
com/publications/growth-china-india-research/ [https://perma.cc/PPL4-2CV6].
20. GARY GEREFFI, NEW OFFSHORING OF JOBS AND GLOBAL DEVELOPMENT 18 (2005).
21. Park, supra note 19.
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sufficient to drive Cuba’s future economic growth. Over the long term,
the prices of primary commodities tend to decline relative to the prices of
manufactured goods, causing the terms of trade of the commodityexporting countries to deteriorate.22 At some point in the future, therefore,
Cuba needs to broaden its export base to include more manufacturing
industries. This will require Cuba to take initiatives to both build the
infrastructure for manufacturing and prepare its labor force for
manufacturing jobs. Cuba may also need to seek greater access to export
markets through bilateral or multilateral free trade agreements.
As Cuba goes down the path of export-oriented growth, however, it
must be mindful of the limitations of that growth model and should
prepare, at the earliest time possible, to upgrade its industries from lowend manufacturing to high-end manufacturing and knowledge-intensive
service industries. Cuba should heed the lessons of China, where the
wealth generated from the country’s manufacturing boom was funneled
into real estate and other asset bubbles, rather than into the expansion of
the country’s innovative capacities. In this respect, Cuba should emulate
India by fostering homegrown innovation and entrepreneurship. Cuba’s
ultimate goal should be to transition into a diverse, broad-based economy
that does not overly rely on the export sector or on any particular industry
or industries.
III. PERILS OF CUBA’S NEW ROLE
As Cuban policymakers explore ways for Cuba to participate in the
world economy, they need to be aware of the perils of such participation.
Below, this article will discuss three particular perils that Cuba may
encounter in its efforts to streamline its economy: challenges posed by
Cuba’s protection of foreign investment through investor-state dispute
settlements, WTO rules’ constraints on Cuba’s use of domestic support
measures, and foreign trade barriers that may be erected against Cuban
exports by its trading partners.
A. Investor-State Dispute Settlement
Protecting foreign investment is a crucial component of any economic
strategy that prioritizes the attraction of foreign investment. Cuba’s FDI
plan is no exception. As mentioned earlier, Cuba’s 1995 Foreign
Investment Act guaranteed compensation for expropriation of foreign

22. This is known as the Prebisch-Singer Hypothesis in economics. See David I. Harvey
et al., The Prebisch–Singer Hypothesis: Four Centuries of Evidence, 92 REV. ECON. & STAT. 367,
367 (2010).
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investment.23 The BITs Cuba has signed also offer this protection. The
BIT between Cuba and Spain, for example, provides that
“[n]ationalization, expropriation or any other measure having similar
characteristics or effects that might be taken by the authorities of one
Contracting Party against investments in its territory by investors of the
other Contracting Party should be imposed only in the public interest and
in accordance with the law, and should in no case be discriminatory.”24 It
further provides that “[t]he Contracting Party that imposes such measures
shall pay the investor or the investor’s assignees appropriate
compensation without undue delay and in freely convertible and
transferable currency.”25 Other provisions of the Cuba-Spain BIT impose
requirements commonly found in international investment treaties,
including fair and equitable treatment, most-favored-nation, and national
treatment requirements.26
Not only does Cuba provide for protection of foreign investors
through domestic law and bilateral investment treaties, such protection is
also actionable through investor-state dispute settlement proceedings. A
foreign investor from a country that has signed a BIT with Cuba can bring
an investor-state arbitration proceeding against the Cuban government
before an arbitral tribunal specified in the BIT. The Cuba-Spain BIT, for
example, authorizes such arbitral proceedings before (1) tribunals in
Cuba; (2) ad hoc arbitral tribunals “established in accordance with the
Arbitration Rules of the United Nations Commission on International
Trade Law;” or (3) the International Chamber of Commerce arbitral
tribunal in Paris.27
Such investor-state arbitration proceedings represent a major peril for
Cuba. As Cuba tackles difficult economic problems down the road, it may
have to take measures that will frustrate the expectations of foreign
investors, who could then challenge those measures as expropriation or
violations of the fair and equitable treatment requirement. Such
challenges decrease the policy space a developing country like Cuba
would need in order to handle economic emergencies.
Argentina’s experience with investor-state arbitration proceedings
provides a good example of the perils that would face Cuba. In 1994,
Argentina ratified the Convention on the Settlement of Investment
Disputes Between States and Nationals of Other States, which confers
jurisdiction over investor-state disputes on the International Center for
the Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID), a World Bank agency
23. Supra Part I.
24. Agreement on the Promotion and Reciprocal Protection of Investments, Cuba-Spain,
art. V, ¶ 1, May 27, 1994, 1902 U.N.T.S. 305.
25. Id.
26. Id. art. IV.
27. Id. art. XI, ¶ 2.
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established to handle such disputes.28 Since then, foreign investors have
initiated forty-three arbitration proceedings against Argentina before the
ICSID, claiming $65 billion in total damages.29 Overall, the ICSID has
“awarded claimants over $400 million.”30
A large number of the ICSID proceedings against Argentina stem
from the emergency economic measures Argentina put in place during its
1998–2002 financial crisis. During the 1990s, Argentina privatized many
public services firms and put them in the hands of foreign investors. To
attract foreign investment, Argentina indexed public services fees to U.S.
dollars and authorized adjustments to those fees based on the U.S.
consumer price index.31 This indexation had to be scrapped during the
1998–2002 financial crisis; Argentina also abandoned its fixed exchange
rate policy.32 Foreign investors lodged thirty-three claims against
Argentina before the ICSID, challenging these emergency economic
measures as expropriations of foreign investment because they upset
investors’ expectations under the original investment contracts.33
The ICSID has been rather inconsistent as to the extent to which a
sovereign government will be allowed to undertake emergency economic
measures without being held liable to foreign investors. In two ICSID
arbitration proceedings, LG&E Energy Corp. v. Argentina and
Continental Casualty Company v. Argentina, the ICSID arbitral tribunals
found that Argentina’s actions in response to the financial crisis fell under
Article XI of the U.S.-Argentina BIT, which exempts a state party from
liability when its actions are necessary to preserve the public order.34
However, in another arbitration proceeding, Sempra Energy
International v. Argentina, the ICSID arbitral tribunal reached the
opposite conclusion, holding that Argentina’s emergency actions did not
qualify for the necessity exemption under Article XI of the U.S.—
Argentina BIT.35 More importantly, the ICSID tribunal in Sempra Energy
28. Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes Between States and Nationals of
Other States, ICSID Convention, art. 25, Mar. 18, 1965, 80 Stat. 344.
29. Oscar Lopez, Smart Move: Argentina to Leave the ICSID, 1 CORNELL INT’L L.J.
ONLINE 120, 122, http://cornellilj.org/smart-move-argentina-to-leave-the-icsid/ [https://perma.
cc/N5XN-9ZK9].
30. Id.
31. Diego Petrecolla & Martin Lousteau, Foreign Direct Investment in Argentina During
the 1990s, 2 LATIN AM. BUS. REV., no. 1/2, 2001, at 38–39.
32. Sebastian Edwards, The Great Exchange Rate Debate After Argentina, 13 N. AM. J.
ECON. & FIN. 237, 239 (2002).
33. E.g., LG&E Energy Corp. et al. v. Arg. Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/02/1, Award
(July 25, 2007), http://icsidfiles.worldbank.org/icsid/ICSIDBLOBS/OnlineAwards/C208/DC
786_En.pdf [https://perma.cc/E6JS-Y7GB].
34. Id. ¶¶ 1–2; Cont’l Cas. Co. v. Arg. Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/03/9, Award, ¶¶
173–74 (Sept. 5, 2008), http://www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/case-documents/ita0228.pdf
[https://perma.cc/LZ55-VXFB].
35. Sempra Energy Int’l v. Arg. Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/02/16, Award, ¶ 388
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International held that whether a state action falls under the necessity
exemption under Article XI cannot be determined by examining whether
the state undertaking the action did so in good faith, but will also be
subject to substantive judicial review.36
Although a party to sixty BITs, Cuba has not ratified the ICSID
Convention and has chosen other arbitral tribunals, such as the
International Chamber of Commerce, as the venues of settling investorstate disputes.37 This allows Cuba to avoid the ICSID, which has been
perceived as one of the most hostile arbitral tribunals towards developing
countries.38 But as long as Cuba participates in investor-state dispute
settlements in some form, there will be a tangible risk that these
settlements will compromise Cuba’s sovereign policy space. Cuban
policymakers should not ignore this risk.
B. Domestic Support Measures
Besides the risk of being challenged in investor-state dispute
settlement proceedings, Cuba also faces risks of being found in violation
of WTO rules if it attempts to support its domestic industries through
subsidies or other favorable policies. Cuba has never been challenged
before the World Trade Organization,39 but that merely results from
Cuba’s lack of meaningful participation in world trade. As Cuba deepens
its interactions with international markets, Cuba’s domestic policy tools,
particularly those related to the protection of its domestic industries, will
likely be subject to WTO dispute settlement proceedings.
WTO rules have many constraints on a member country’s use of
policy measures aimed at supporting its domestic industries. The GATT
forbids contracting states from protecting domestic production by
applying internal taxes and charges and laws, regulations or requirements
affecting the internal sale or distribution of products to imported or
domestic products.40 The Agreement on Trade-Related Investment
Measures (TRIMs) also contains this “national treatment” requirement.41
Particularly, TRIMs singles out local content requirements (i.e.,
requirements that firms purchase or use products of domestic origin, as
(Sept. 28, 2007), http://icsidfiles.worldbank.org/icsid/ICSIDBLOBS/OnlineAwards/C8/DC694_
En.pdf [https://perma.cc/85YJ-FEHE].
36. Id.
37. U.S. INT’L TRADE COMM’N, INVESTIGATION NO. 332-413, THE ECONOMIC IMPACT OF
U.S. SANCTIONS WITH RESPECT TO CUBA 3-22 (2001).
38. Diana Marie Wick, The Counter-Productivity of ICSID Denunciation and Proposals
for Change, 11 J. INT’L BUS. L. 239, 271 (2012).
39. DISPUTES BY MEMBER, supra note 6.
40. General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, art. III, ¶ 1, Oct. 30, 1947, 61 Stat. A3.
41. Agreement on Trade-Related Investment Measures, Marrakesh Agreement
Establishing the World Trade Organization, annex 1A, art. 2, Apr. 15, 1994, 1868 U.N.T.S. 186.
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violating the national treatment requirement).42 The Agreement on
Subsidies and Countervailing Measures (SCM Agreement) provides even
more extensive constraints on domestic support measures. The SCM
Agreement limits the use of countervailable subsidies, defined as a
“financial contribution by a government or any public body” that are
specific to an industry or a group of industries and confer a benefit on the
industry or industries.43
The kinds of domestic support measures that could be subject to WTO
challenges are wide-ranging, as demonstrated by China’s experience with
such challenges, summarized in Table 3 below. During the fifteen years
China has been a WTO member, it has been challenged on numerous
policies related to the protection of its domestic industries, including
preferential tariffs, taxes, grants and loans, and restrictions on or
discriminations against foreign firms. To the extent that Cuban
policymakers are considering similar policies, it will be important for
them to anticipate the possible WTO challenges.
Table 3. WTO Challenges of China’s Domestic
Support Measures44
Dispute

Complaining
Countries
China—Value-Added United States
Tax on Integrated
Circuits (DS309)

Alleged WTO
Violations
GATT; China
WTO
Accession
Protocol; GATS

Outcome

China—Measures
Affecting Imports of
Automobile Parts
(DS339, 340, 342)

GATT; SCM
Agreement;
TRIMs; China
WTO
Accession
Protocol

Rulings
against
China by
both Panel
and
Appellate
Body
Mutually
agreed
solution

China—Certain
Measures Granting
Refunds, Reductions,
Exemptions from

Nature of Policies
Challenged
Preferential valueadded tax for
domestically produced or designed
integrated circuits
European
Preferential import
Union, United tariffs for automoStates,
bile parts imported
Canada
for use in the
manufacture of
vehicles for sale in
China
United States, Preferential tax
Mexico
refunds, reductions, or exemptions for firms in

GATT; SCM
Agreement;
TRIMs; China
WTO

Mutually
agreed
solution

42. Id. annex ¶ 1.
43. Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures, Marrakesh Agreement
Establishing the World Trade Organization, annex 1A, art. 1.1, Apr. 15, 1994, 1869 U.N.T.S. 14.
44. DISPUTES BY MEMBER, supra note 6, click Disputes by Respondent.
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Taxes and Other
Payments (DS 358,
359)

China on the
condition that
purchase domestic
goods or meet
export performance requirements.
China—Measures
United States Measures restrictAffecting Trading
ing trading rights
Rights and
with respect to
Distribution Services
imported films,
for Certain
audiovisual
Publications and
products, sound
Audiovisual
recordings and
Entertainment
publications;
Products (DS 363)
discriminatory
policies against
foreign suppliers
of publications and
audiovisual
products.
China—Measures
European
Discriminatory
Affecting Financial
Union, United policies against
Information Services States,
foreign financial
and Foreign Financial Canada
information
Information Suppliers
suppliers
(DS 372, 373, 378)
China—Grants,
United States, Preferential
Loans and Other
Mexico,
measures offering
Incentives (DS 387,
Guatemala
grants, loans and
388, 390)
other incentives to
firms in China
China—Certain
Measures Affecting
Electronic Payment
Services (DS 413)

United States

China—Measures
United States
concerning wind
power equipment (DS
419)
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Accession
Protocol

GATS; GATT;
China WTO
Accession
Protocol

Rulings
against
China by
both Panel
and
Appellate
Body

GATS; TRIPs

Mutually
agreed
solution

Agreement on
the Agriculture;
GATT; SCM
Agreement;
China WTO
Accession
Protocol
GATS

In
consultation

GATT; SCM
Agreement;
China WTO
Accession
Protocol

In
consultation

Ruling
against
China by
Panel
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China—Certain
Measures Affecting
the Automobile and
Automobile-Parts
Industries (DS 450)

United States

China—Measures
Relating to the
Production and
Exportation of
Apparel and Textile
Products (DS 451)

Mexico

China—Measures
Related to
Demonstration Bases
and common Service
Platforms Programs
(DS 489)

United States

China—Tax
United States
Measures Concerning
Certain Domestically
Produced Aircraft
(DS 501)

manufacturing
wind power
equipment in
China
Measures
providing
subsidies to
automobile and
automobile-parts
enterprises in
China contingent
upon export
performance
Preferential tax,
import duty, and
loan policies
supporting
producers and
exporters of
apparel and textile
products
Measures
providing
subsidies to
enterprises in
several industries
in China
contingent upon
export
performance
Preferential tax
measures for the
sale of certain
domestically
produced aircraft
in China

[Vol. 29

GATT; SCM
Agreement;
China WTO
Accession
Protocol

In
consultation

Agreement on
Agriculture;
GATT; SCM
Agreement;
China WTO
Accession
Protocol

In
consultation

SCM
Agreement

Mutually
agreed
solution

GATT; China
WTO
Accession
Protocol

In
consultation

C. Foreign Trade Barriers
Yet another peril Cuba faces in its participation in the world economy
are foreign trade barriers erected by its trading partners. In the WTO era,
because tariffs cannot exceed their bound levels, the most persistent trade
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barriers are those based on non-tariff measures. Two common non-tariff
trade barriers are antidumping and countervailing duties, special duties
assessed on certain imports that constitute unfair trade practices and cause
injury or threat of injury to the domestic industries of the importing
country. When Cuban exports become subject to antidumping and
countervailing duties, such duties will likely be high because of the
extensive intervention by the state in the Cuban economy. WTO rules
allow the calculation of antidumping duties using a non-market economy
methodology, which uses the higher product prices from third countries
(“surrogate values”) as the normal value to which Cuban export prices
will be compared.45 In addition, in calculating the amount of
countervailing duties, WTO member countries may use price benchmarks
from third countries if they believe the in-country prices in Cuba have
been distorted by government intervention.46 Countries have used these
special antidumping and countervailing methodologies to limit the export
potential of China,47 and will likely be used against Cuba if Cuba’s
exports reach a scale sufficient to threaten the manufacturing industries
of other countries.
Some other non-tariff trade barriers may take the form of
environmental laws, product safety standards, or labeling laws that have
a disproportionately adverse impact on trade. WTO member countries
may maintain such barriers if they meet the requirements of the general
exceptions under Article XX of the GATT.48 In addition, the Agreement
on the Application of Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures 49 and the
Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade50 both permit such barriers and
allow WTO member countries to impose restrictive measures on imports
for the sake of protecting legitimate regulatory interests. Indeed, the only
WTO dispute settlement proceeding Cuba has initiated thus far
challenged what it argued was a non-tariff trade barrier, the plain
packaging requirement Australia imposed for tobacco products.51
45. Agreement on Implementation of Article VI of the General Agreement on Tariffs and
Trade 1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 1A, art.
2.2, Apr. 15, 1994, 1868 U.N.T.S. 201.
46. General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 1994, Apr. 15, 1994, art. VI, 1867 U.N.T.S.
187 [hereinafter GATT].
47. See Wentong Zheng, Trade Law’s Responses to the Rise of China, 34 BERKELEY J.
INT’L L. 109, 124 (2016).
48. GATT, supra note 46, art. XX.
49. Agreement on the Application of Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures, Marrakesh
Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 1A, art. 2 ¶ 4, 1867 U.N.T.S. 493.
50. Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the
World Trade Organization, annex 1A, art. 2.5, 1868 U.N.T.S. 120.
51. See Request for Consultations by Cuba, Australia—Certain Measures Concerning
Trademarks, Geographical Indications and Other Plain Packaging Requirements Applicable to
Tobacco Products and Packaging, WTO Doc. WT/DS458/1 (May 7, 2013).
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IV. CONCLUSION
While starting to leave economic isolation, Cuba still faces a long road
to an open, prosperous economy. A successful economic strategy for
Cuba requires Cuba to find its rightful place in the global economy.
Drawing from the experience of other developing countries, this article
explained Cuba’s options for participating in the world economy as well
as the perils associated with the options. Cuban policymakers should
weigh the pros and cons of each option as they map out Cuba’s future
development path.
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